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We discuss the nature of reality in the ontological context of Penrose’s math-matter-mind triangle.
The triangle suggests the circularity of the widespread view that math arises from the mind, the
mind arises out of matter, and that matter can be explained in terms of math. Non-physicists should
be wary of any claim that modern physics leads us to any particular resolution of this circularity,
since even the sample of three theoretical physicists writing this paper hold three divergent views.
Some physicists believe that current physics has already found the basic framework for a complete
description of reality, and only has to fill in the details. Others suspect that no single framework,
from physics or other sources, will ever capture reality. Yet others guess that reality might be
approached arbitrarily closely by some form of future physics, but probably based on completely
different frameworks. We will designate these three approaches as the fundamentalist, secular and
mystic views of the world, as seen by practicing physicists. We present and contrast each of these
views, which arguably form broad categories capturing most if not all interpretations of physics. We
argue that this diversity in the physics community is more useful than an ontological monoculture,
since it motivates physicists to tackle unsolved problems with a wide variety of approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF
METAPHOR
Although physicists agree on the formalism of their
theories and the methodology of their experiments, they
often disagree about the question of what it all means. A
few hundred years ago, this was only to be expected, since
at its inception, physics covered very limited aspects of
the world. However, now physics can arguably lay proper
claim to providing an effective description of all material
processes, if not in practice then at least in principle.
And with no obstacles visible to a full understanding of
the dance of matter and energy in space and time, what
aspect of the world would not be amenable to an analysis
by physics, again at least in principle?
The obvious objection would be to point out that
notions such as meaning or beauty or responsibility have
been explicitly filtered out of physics, as part of its
methodology. To believe that you could remove some
of the most important aspects of human experience,
and then hope to fully reconstruct them through
the mathematical formalism of physics strikes many
as absurd. This view, that physics can only cover
limited aspects of our experience, we will call the
secular view. The opposite view that holds that a
straightforward application and further exploration of
the current framework of physics will eventually cover
and explain all of reality we will call the fundamentalist
view.
There is a reason for choosing religious terms for
our metaphors. First of all, they indicate a mind
set, a psychological attitude that corresponds quite
closely to the ones we will discuss among physicists.
Secondly, they are universal, in that the tension between
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FIG. 1: Our starting diagram, based on a similar one by
Penrose [1]
the more fundamentalist and the more secular views
of religion occur everywhere, in Christianity, Judaism,
Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and so on.
There is one other type of viewpoint that is widespread
across religions, and that is the mystic view of the world.
Many religions have produced mystics who use precise
methods and descriptions in order to find deeper forms
of truth that will eventually transcend both methods
and descriptions, leading to insight that is utterly down-
to-earth but that cannot be captured by the net of
description.
Among physicists, the mystic view holds that a future
form of physics may come arbitrarily close to a genuine
understanding of reality, both from a pragmatic and an
“insight” point of view. However, to what extent this
insight can be captured in any way through presently
familiar forms of mathematical physics or any other
2future form of physics relying on description, is not
clear and is left as an open question. This may sound
presumptuous, but there are good historical reasons
to expect fundamental changes in what is considered
legitimate physics. For example, the discovery of
quantum mechanics toppled some of the notions held
most near and dear by physicists, such as reproducibility
of experiments.
In summary, we will discuss three broad categories of
world views that physicists may hold, which we label
fundamentalist, mystic, and secular. They differ in their
view of whether a physics framework will ultimately
give access to all of reality. The three answers are,
respectively: yes, the current framework; yes, a future
framework; no, no framework present or future. In what
follows, the fundamentalist view is advocated by Max
Tegmark, the secular view by Mark Alford, and the
mystic view by Piet Hut.
A useful starting point for the debate is the Matter-
Mind-Math triangle (Fig. 1), put forward by Penrose
[1, 2].
This figure encapsulates the idea that matter somehow
embodies mathematics, the mind arises from matter,
and mathematics is a product of the mind. If such
a circular production seems unsatisfactory, we can ask
which of these three arrows should be removed. In
Section II we see that the fundamentalist, secular and
mystic viewpoints each find different parts of the diagram
to be the weakest, and we set forth their arguments and
counter-arguments. This sets the stage for Section III,
where each viewpoint gives its version of how the diagram
should be. Their strengths and weaknesses are debated
vigorously in Sections IV-VI. We close with the three
different visions of the future in Section VII and a brief
conclusion in Section VIII.
II. THREE CRITIQUES OF THE PENROSE
DIAGRAM
A. The Fundamentalist Critique
I am a mathematical fundamentalist: I single out math
as the underlying structure of the universe, and disagree
strongly with the symmetry between math, mind and
matter that is expressed in the Penrose diagram. I have
no problem with the reduction of the world around us,
including our minds, to mathematical laws of physics —
rather, I find it elegant and beautiful. I am therefore
happy with the Math→Matter and Matter→Mind links,
but object to the Mind→Math link.
1. Against Mind → Math Link
I adopt the formalist definition of mathematics: it
is the study of formal systems. Although this pursuit
itself is of course secondary to the human mind, I believe
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FIG. 2: Fundamentalist critique of the Penrose diagram
that the mathematical structures that this process
uncovers are “out there”, completely independently of
the discoverer. Consequently, math is not a product of
the human mind, and there should be no Mind→Math
link.
Math is also unique in its ability to circumvent
the classic problem of infinite regress, where every
explanation of a statement in human language must
be in the form of another unexplained statement. The
trick is the emergent concepts idea of section 2.E in [3].
Although whims of human fashion influence the choice
of which particular formal systems we explore at any
one time, and which aspects thereof, we are continually
increasing the amount of charted territory. The street
map of mathematical structures is “out there”, and
any intelligent entity who begins to study any corner
of it will inevitably discover at least the main plazas
and connecting boulevards, even if many charming back
alleys and sprawling suburbs are missed due to cultural
prejudice. The key is that the explorer needs no a priori
explanation of what concepts like integers, vectors or
groups mean, since she herself will introduce notation
for them and create her own interpretation of them.
Mathematics is thus the same whether it is discovered
by us, by computers or by extraterrestrials.
2. Defense of Math → Matter Link
Although I respect the Secular “shut-up-and-
calculate” attitude (Section II B) I feel that the evidence
favors the Math→Matter Link. Physical theories are
considered successful if they make predictions that are
subsequently verified. The view that the physical world
is intrinsically mathematical has scored many successes
of exactly this type, which in my opinion increase
its credibility. The idea that the universe is in some
sense mathematical goes back to the Pythagoreans, and
appears again in Galileo’s statement that the Universe
is a grand book written in the language of mathemat-
ics, and in Wigner’s discussion of the “unreasonable
3effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences”
[4]. After Galileo promulgated the idea, additional
mathematical regularities beyond his wildest dreams
were uncovered, ranging from the motions of planets
to the properties of atoms. After Wigner had written
his famous essay, the standard model of particle physics
revealed new “unreasonable” mathematical order in the
microcosm of elementary particles, and my guess is that
history will repeat itself again and again. I know of no
other compelling explanation for this trend than that
the physical world really is completely mathematical,
isomorphic to some mathematical structure.
Let me briefly elaborate on what I mean by this
hypothesis that mathematical and physical existence
are equivalent. It can be viewed as a form of radical
Platonism, asserting that the mathematical structures in
Plato’s realm of ideas or Rucker’s “mindscape” [5] exist
in a physical sense. It is akin to what John Barrow refers
to as “pi in the sky” [6], what Robert Nozick called the
principle of fecundity [7] and what David Lewis called
modal realism [8]. However, it is crucial to distinguish
between two ways of viewing a physical theory: from
the outside view of a physicist studying its mathematical
equations, like a bird surveying a landscape from high
above it, and from the inside view of an observer living
in the world described by the equations, like a frog
living in the landscape surveyed by the bird. From the
bird perspective, the physical world is a mathematical
structure, an abstract, immutable entity existing outside
of space and time. If history were a movie, the structure
would correspond not to a single frame of it but to the
entire videotape.
Consider, for example, a world made up of pointlike
particles moving around in three-dimensional space. In
four-dimensional spacetime – the bird perspective – these
particle trajectories resemble a tangle of spaghetti. If the
frog sees a particle moving with constant velocity, the
bird sees a straight strand of uncooked spaghetti. If the
frog sees a pair of orbiting particles, the bird sees two
spaghetti strands intertwined like a double helix. To the
frog, the world is described by Newton’s laws of motion
and gravitation. To the bird, it is described by the
geometry of the pasta – a mathematical structure. The
frog itself is merely a thick bundle of pasta, whose highly
complex intertwining corresponds to a cluster of particles
that store and process information. Our universe is of
course far more complicated than this example, since
we do not yet know to what mathematical structure
it corresponds. Part of the challenge here is that
reality can appear dramatically different in frog and bird
perspectives, and the phenomenology linking them can
be more difficult than finding the correct mathematical
structure itself. It took the genius of Einstein to realize
that frogs living in Minkowski space would perceive time
to slow down at high speeds, and that of Everett to
realize that a single deterministically evolving quantum
wavefunction in Hilbert space contains within it a vast
number of frog perspectives where certain events appear
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FIG. 3: Secular critique of the Penrose diagram
to occur randomly.
3. Defense of Matter → Mind Link
I believe that consciousness is the way information feels
when being processed. Since matter can be arranged to
process information in numerous ways of vastly varying
complexity, this implies a rich variety of levels and types
of consciousness. The particular type of consciousness
that we subjectively know is then a phenomenon that
arises in certain highly complex physical systems that
input, process, store and output information. This
implies that there is nothing wrong with the Matter →
Mind link.
This hypothesis has clearly not been proven. However,
this can hardly be held against it, since it can strictly
speaking never be proven: I cannot even prove to my
colleagues that I personally am self-aware—they simply
have to take my word for it. Moreover, the spectacular
successes of computers and neural networks over the past
decades have arguably made the hypothesis appear less
implausible than before.
Although believing in this hypothesis may make some
people feel less happy about what they are, I have so far
seen no hard scientific evidence against it. Rather, many
objections seem to be based on a combination of human
vanity and wishful thinking. Humanity has already had
its collective ego deflated so many times (by Copernicus,
Darwin, Freud, infinite Universe cosmology, Deep Blue,
etc.) that yet another demotion would not bother me
at all. I am what I am and will continue to enjoy feeling
the way I subjectively feel regardless what the underlying
explanation turns out to be.
B. The Secular Critique
I am a secular scientist. I enjoy practicing science,
and believe that it is of great practical importance and
4intellectual value. Everyone should take science seriously,
while remembering that it is a human creation, not
an all-embracing metaphysics. I am therefore happy
with the Mind→Math link. I appreciate the scientific
interest and usefulness of physiological explanations for
human behavior, but I am unenthusiastic about the
Matter→Mind link as a metaphysical claim. I disagree
strongly with the Math→Matter link.
1. Against Math → Matter Link
All physical scientists are impressed by the “unreason-
able effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences”
[4]. That effectiveness is indeed spectacular. But the
Math→Matter linkage in the Penrose diagram tries to go
further, inferring from the effectiveness of math that it
is itself the ultimate substance of the universe. Wigner,
however, avoiding metaphysical speculation, simply con-
cluded that we should be grateful for the effectiveness of
mathematical methods, and get on with the business of
exploiting them. I agree with him.
I will give my detailed criticism of the Math→Matter
link in section VIA, where we discuss the Fundamen-
talist’s version of the MMM diagram, in which this link
plays the foundational role. For now I just want to point
out that although our current theories of physics and our
current way of doing mathematics may seem inevitable,
we should be wary of assigning them any kind of fun-
damental status. History shows that both physics and
math have changed markedly over time.
The Fundamentalist suggests that math is a particu-
larly secure foundation because it can resist the infinite
regress of explanation via “emergent concepts”. But an
infinite regress of explanations only arises when one is
confronted by the ultimate skeptic, who demands proof
of everything. Such a person will not believe the “emer-
gent concepts” claim either, since it cannot be proved.
For any normal person, explanations will be accepted at
some point, the infinite regress will never arise, and math
will not be needed as a foundation for knowledge.
2. Against Matter → Mind link
Like the Mystic, I am unenthusiastic about the
Matter→Mind link, if it is taken as a form of
reductionism that states that the mental phenomena are
“really just material processes”, as if the material were
somehow more fundamental than the mental. Of course
it is conceivable that everything could be reduced to
physics, but it is also conceivable that it could not. Our
scientific theories are not definitive accounts of nature’s
secrets, so there is no point in worrying about what it
would be like if they were. And what happens as our
theories of the material world become better and better?
Is there a gradual reduction of the mental to the physical?
Not at all. We can find out as much as we like about
the brain, but this does not provide a new and better
foundation for our concepts of mental things [9]. For
example, science may find brain processes that correlate
with mystic experiences, or genes that determine shyness.
Such progress is extremely interesting, but it happens not
to tell us anything about the meaning of “the mystical”
or “shyness”.
Of course, scientific progress does influence our
beliefs and attitudes. Rather than saying that our
friend is possessed by demons or went crazy we may
now talk about whether he is suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia or manic depression. These are not just
synonyms for “crazy”, they represent a richer picture of
the person involved, a more specific set of assumptions
about his probable behavior, even a different view of
his curability and humanity. Our mental concepts have
evolved, but they have not been reduced to physical ones.
Even if, as the Mystic fears (section II C), we started
talking in materialistic terms—“My brain processes are
causing me to leave the room”—would that mean we were
now right where we had been wrong before?
I therefore find myself sharing the Fundamentalist’s
professed indifference to scientific discoveries about how
the brain works. Would people feel diminished if it
became possible to build Turing-test-passing machines?
I don’t think so. The machines we currently make
are stupid. If we made dazzlingly intelligent, kind and
beautiful machines we would see nothing wrong in being
like them. We would probably claim they were patterned
after our image.
3. Defense of Mind → Math Link
The Fundamentalist (Section IIA 1) and the Mystic
(Section II C 1) both express the view that Math cannot
be dependent on the human mind because mathematical
correctness has a solid “out-there” feeling about it. I do
not find this a compelling argument. Many conceptual
systems with which we are deeply familiar give us that
feeling of inevitable rightness. For example, the grammar
of ones native language has exactly this character:
one “stumbles over” the incorrectness of ungrammatical
sentences. Even morality has a solid core of indisputably
right and wrong types of actions to which we have an
immediate and visceral response, though we normally do
not discuss these because we take them for granted and
spend our time arguing over the more ambiguous cases.
The denial of the Mind → Math link corresponds to
the Mathematical Platonist doctrine that mathematical
objects have an independent existence of their own. It is
interesting in the context of the MMM diagram to note
that the main argument for Mathematical Platonism is
the “Quine-Putnam indispensability argument” [10, 11]
which exploits the Math-Matter connection. Quine
and Putnam point out that mathematics is an essential
component of science, as are other exotic entities such as
electric fields and protons. So if we grant that electric
5fields and protons exist independently of us, then we
should give the same status to the mathematical objects
(real numbers, Hilbert spaces, etc) that we use in science.
Many philosophical objections have been raised against
the Quine-Putnam argument [12]. As a physicist I find
it unconvincing because there is a wide range of entities
that are posited in physical theories, from fairly concrete
ones like electric fields to more abstract ones like an
object’s wave function, or its center of gravity, that we
don’t (all) think of as “existing” or “being real” in the
normal sense of those words. So just because something
plays a role in our theorizing doesn’t mean it is a real
object. And when a physicist argues that something is
real he or she invokes a specific instance where the object
is present: “of course electric fields are real: you can tell
that there’s an electric field around a proton because it
pushes other positive charges away.” One couldn’t speak
of Hilbert space or the complex plane as giving away
its presence in a similar way. This is related to the
fact that what physicists do when they check whether
their theories give a good description of the real world
is very different from what mathematicians do when
they check whether their results are true. In fact, by
scientific standards (and that is what Quine and Putnam
are ultimately appealing to) mathematics really doesn’t
have a “check against nature” step in its procedures at
all. Checking whether a theorem is true is not like an
experiment, it is more like checking whether a sentence
is grammatical.
In his critique of the Mind→Math link, the Fundamen-
talist asserts that any intelligent entity will agree with
us about math. For example, aliens from another planet
might have incomprehensible ideas about many things,
but their math would map on to (or extend) ours. This
is a rather vague statement because it would be up to us
to decide which parts of the alien œuvre we call “math”.
It could just reduce to the empty statement that if we
pick out the parts that look like our math, then they
will map onto our math. The Fundamentalist takes it as
an article of faith that a nice mapping, covering a rea-
sonable amount of material, would necessarily be found,
but this need not happen. We might be faced with “in-
scrutable aliens”, in whose behavior we cannot cleanly
identify anything that corresponds to “doing math”. For
example, their successful feats of engineering might not
be based on a coherent mathematical theory of physics
but on what looks to us like a set of rules of thumb.
Another possibility is “pragmatic aliens” [13], who study
mathematical questions, but with a different approach
from our own. Like us, they have proven Fermat’s last
theorem: they simply computed millions of examples,
and declared it true. Their mathematicians have devel-
oped such numerical methods to a high art, and have
numerical “proofs” of many theorems that we had not
even conjectured. They seem unimpressed by the rigor
of our analytic proofs, arguing that that there is little fun-
damental difference between the small chance that their
numerical searches have missed errors in their theorems,
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FIG. 4: Mystic critique of the Penrose diagram
and the small chance that we have failed to notice errors
in our analytic proofs.
Of course, even if we find we can agree on math with all
the aliens that we have met, it still wouldn’t cast doubt
on the Mind→Math link. It would just mean that in
certain respects our minds are alike. One could speculate
on evolutionary reasons for that, or simply accept it as a
fact. And of course, the next batch of aliens might turn
out to be different.
C. The Mystic Critique
I take a mystic view of science. Unlike the Secularist,
I expect that science will ultimately give us profound
insights into the real nature of the world. But
unlike the Fundamentalist, I believe these will not
emerge in any straightforward way from science as
it is currently constituted. Rather, I expect science
to metamorphose into something so different that it
is literally inconceivable for us. So in that sense I
agree with the Secularist that physics will probably
see upheavals even (far) more fundamental than the
discovery of quantum mechanics. And I agree with
the Fundamentalist that Science will ultimately come
arbitrarily close to a full understanding of reality.
The reason I like the word ‘mystic’ is that the future
science I envision will be so different from current science,
and the role of elements such as math and experiments
will be so different from what they are now, that we have
not the foggiest idea of what these will look like. The
structures of a future science will remain a mystery, and
the only thing we can be pretty sure of is that our current
lines of reason will be seen to be naive and superficial,
compared with the newer and deeper insights.
So let me be clear: the word ‘mystic’ for me points
to a form of probing into mysteries, as it was meant in
Medieval times. Note that mystics were very keen to
try to show structure and to enumerate parts of that
structure – the term ‘mystic’ just happened to get a bad
6rap later on, and is now unjustifiably associated with
attempts to confuse and muddle a situation.
As for the Penrose diagram, I have deep doubts about
all the links. Making these links now, before a future
unification, seems premature. I strongly believe that the
process of unification, which has successfully uncovered
intrinsic links between, e.g., electricity and magnetism,
space and time, matter and energy, will continue. What
can be more different than matter and energy? Their
unification was totally unexpected. If history is any
guide, future unifications will occur that are currently
equally unexpected. And one example may well involve
our three M aspects, matter, mind, and math. These
three can then no longer can be treated as independent
notions that have the power to point to each other.
Drawing arrows, in my view, is simply a precursor to
the program of unification, in which nature is discovered
to be already unified more than we had thought. It
was through tracing the arrows between electricity and
magnetism – how exactly can an electric charge generate
a magnetic field, and a magnet generate an electric field
– that electromagnetism was discovered.
Science, like any human activity, is ultimately given in
experience, and understood through the lens of conscious
experience. Within experience, we can discern subject
and object poles. The trend of science, so far, has
been to explain/reduce all phenomena to processes that
are described purely in terms of objects. The rise of
the subject is seen as somehow being a byproduct of
sufficiently complex phenomena, taking place in brains,
material systems that can be fully described objectively.
While not denying the correlations between subjective
experience and objective processes in our nervous system,
I do not want to buy into an unquestioned prior status of
the object pole over the subject pole of experience [14].
The Fundamentalist defends the Matter→Mind link on
the basis of advances in neurophysiology. I do not deny
that a deep understanding of the material structure of the
human brain will shed a lot of light on the way in which
we experience; but the very fact that we experience may
completely fall outside such an explanatory framework.
My guess would be that such a question requires a shift
to a wider horizon of knowledge/meaning/explanation
[15, 16].
Let me give an analogy. Imagine a world in which
there are no periodic phenomena, and hence no clocks of
any type in nature. Someone living in such a world may
not easily discover the concept of time, and certainly
not a concept of a linearly progressing time, that can
be mapped onto a one-dimensional line of real numbers.
But it would be wrong to draw the conclusion: no clocks
no time, hence clocks produce time. Similarly, it is too
simple to say: no brains no experience, hence brains
produce experience. Reality may be a lot more subtle.
Brains may tune into an aspect of reality that is explicitly
filtered out when setting up laboratory experiments and
when formulating mathematical regularities summarizing
the lab experiments. This is just one analogy, and merely
meant to illustrate the fact that there is a lot more
room within the “horizon of knowing,” than we normally
consider.
To try to explain our experiences as somehow arising
out of matter is a tempting project. And of course there
is a very tight correlation between the thoughts we think
and the precise electromagnetic and chemical processes in
and between our brain cells. However, the problem with
identifying brain states with experience is that we are
short-changing ourselves. When people talk about their
experience by invoking scientific images, such as “my
hormones drive me to do such and such” or “my taste
buds enjoyed so and so”, they are using technological
thinking as a mode of alienation.
When the Fundamentalist says “I am what I am”,
it strikes me as hopelessly naive. While a sudden new
discovery will not instantaneously change the way we
experience the world, by the time the new knowledge
seeps into the way we view the world, it definitely colors
the way the world presents itself to us. The existence of
placebos is just one striking example of this phenomenon.
1. Transcendence of all three links
I neither want to attack nor defend the three links in
the Penrose diagram, in any absolute way. Rather I want
to transcend them, after first defending them in a relative
way.
The proper defense of all three links is not by ascribing
to them any power in terms of causality, but by pointing
to meaningful correlations that exist between the three
M-elements. To take the example of a movie: within
the movie, all kind of phenomena seem to ‘cause’ other
phenomena, in rather precise ways, but we know that
the real cause lies in the projector, and in the process
of shooting the film in the first place. The correlations
are still important, since without them the movie would
be just a heap of flickering lights without meaning. But
the importance of the correlations is strictly limited to
the framework of the movie, and has no fundamental
meaning whatsoever.
So perhaps this is what makes me a mystic, in that I
am uttering seemingly contradictory statements. Among
the three of us, I am the only one who can accept all three
links, without being bothered by the circular nature of
the ‘vicious triangle’ links. Since I only ascribe relative
meaning to them, I have no need for any foundation.
None of the elements within the story of reality is
absolute or basic; all elements emerge simultaneously
from a deeper unification, speaking in physics lingo. In
Buddhist lingo, for example, this could be called co-
dependent arising [17].
The Platonic position of the Fundamentalist, that
mathematical truth exists all by itself, is extremely
appealing because it seems to correspond closely to our
experience. When we struggle with a mathematical
problem, and finally find a solution, we sometimes
7?
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FIG. 5: Mystic’s view: Other-source Diagram
“stumble” upon it in a way that is rather similar to
the way we stumble over a chair. The resistance that
mathematical objects show to our attempts to prove
what later turns out to be false is akin to the resistance
that physical objects show when we try to wish them
away – both appear to have an existence independent
of the presence or absence of individual humans. In
this sense, I am sympathetic to Alain Connes’ notion of
archaic mathematical reality as being as real as physical
reality [18].
The Secular view that matter and mind have their
own meaningful existence I also find extremely appealing,
within our every-day explanatory framework. In
practical terms, it makes sense to deal with the world
around us in terms of material objects and energetic
processes, and it also makes sense to treat our experience
as something that has equal pride of place.
The problem arises when we try to isolate elements
from this story, and point to some of them as truly
fundamental. In my view, a future physics will transcend
any story we have woven so far.
III. BEYOND THE TRIANGLE: THREE VIEWS
A. The Mystic View: the Other-Source Diagram
Mystic:
I’m against all three arrows in the original picture. In
my alternative picture, “?” stands for an origin that
cannot be easily described, the way each of the other
three can. Our three M’s are more like the shadows on
the wall of Plato’s cave; or in another metaphor, they
are the fish that can be dragged up with the nets of
discursive/conceptual thinking. The Source or Origin
lies beyond that, and is more real than any particular
element of what we conventionally take reality to be.
Note here that in fact, upon finer scrutiny, the
separation between “?” and the three M’s is only illusory.
The real mind cannot be captured in a description, nor
Matter
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FIG. 7: Fundamentalist view: Radical Platonist Diagram
can the real matter. I’d say that even the real math
cannot, if you include the living intuitive process of
discovery.
B. The Secular View: the No-Source Diagram
Secularist:
In so far as the relationship of matter, mind, and math
can be expressed in the form of Penrose-type diagrams,
I prefer figure 6. It presents mind and matter as two
different concepts, but ones that are used together in a
single picture of the world. It places math at a lower
level than matter and mind: math is a particular mental
activity, among many others. There is no reason to give
it a privileged position above, say, morality or language
use.
Although mind and matter are separate in this
diagram, I do not want to imply that they are disjoint
(dualism). I see them as two aspects of the world that
we happen to distinguish quite sharply.
8C. The Fundamentalist View: the Radical
Platonist Diagram
Fundamentalist:
My view is that mathematical structures (the cube,
manifolds, operator algebras, etc.) exist quite inde-
pendently of us humans, so math must be promoted
to the fundamental vertex, as in figure 7. The human
mind then emerges from math, as a self-aware substruc-
ture of an extremely complicated mathematical struc-
ture [3, 13, 19, 20, 21]. Each such substructure subjec-
tively perceives itself as existing in a physically real sense.
Given the mathematical equations that describe our Uni-
verse, an infinitely intelligent mathematician could in
principle deduce the properties of both its material con-
tent and the minds of its inhabitants.
IV. DEBATING THE MYSTIC’S
OTHER-SOURCE DIAGRAM
A. Secular Critique of Mystic’s Other-Source
Diagram
Firstly, I would say that the main difference between
the Mystic and the Fundamentalist is in the question of
timing. The Fundamentalist thinks we already know the
ultimate constituents of the world; the Mystic thinks we
will come to achieve such enlightenment in the future.
This makes it harder to criticize the Mystic’s approach,
because it does not yet have any specific form, but the
basic objection is the same: why will we be entitled
to declare the final victory at some particular moment?
When is the right time to promote whatever picture we
have found workable to metaphysical status?
Secondly, I do not think it is meaningful to invoke a
hidden or ineffable source. If it cannot even be described,
what role can it play in our quest for knowledge? Playing
with the definition of the word “real” seems to me to be
a similarly arbitrary exercise.
Thirdly, I do not think that math deserves to be put
on the same footing as mind and matter. There are
non-mathematicians, but there is nobody who is non-
mental or non-material! What determines which human
activities we include as separate poles connected directly
to the ineffable origin? Why not include language, music,
art, and so on?
B. Mystic’s Response
I see science as converging further and further toward
what is true about reality, but I don’t expect there to
be a particular point at which we can declare victory.
The road toward deeper insight may be unending, simply
because the degrees of what can be called insight may
be inexhaustible. Classical mechanics seemed to give
complete insight, in principle, but quantum mechanics
offered a type of insight that was qualitatively deeper
and other. I have no reason to expect this process of
discovery to stop. My main point is not that we will
reach a final truth, but rather that we will never reach
an absolute boundary beyond which we cannot progress
in getting closer to the truth.
As for the ineffability of a source, that is just a relative
notion. When all you have are concepts such as electricity
and magnetism, then electromagnetism is ineffable, since
it doesn’t fit into your framework. It has to be invoked
as a new type of source that can be projected in your
existing framework, very much like the shadows in Plato’s
cave. But then you enlarge your framework in order to
include the new source.
By the way, the requirement that any source should be
describable is not something I want to buy into. Just as
quantum mechanics has tossed out some of the deepest
held convictions of classical mechanics, similarly I expect
a future science to throw out some of what we now still
see as absolutely essential for the scientific method. Our
current notion of a description may be one of them.
We already see a harbinger of this shift in quantum
mechanics, where the perfectly effable classical idea of
an exhaustive description of all degrees of freedom of a
particle has turned out to be impossible.
As for the Secularist’s existence proof for non-
mathematicians, I agree. However, I had in mind
something wider than technical mathematics. If we want
to classify what we find around and in us under the
three headers of matter, mind, and math, we’d better
take each of these terms rather generally. Under matter
we take anything physical, such forms of pure energy
like radiation, or even the vacuum nowadays. Similarly,
under math we should take any conceptual structure
that we use in our mind in order to make sense of both
mind and (material) world. Language, logic of all sorts
(including common sense reasoning), any distinctions
that are found to be useful I would group here under
“math” – take counting, for example, as a mapping
operation to divide things in the world into distinct
categories. In this way, I think you will agree that there
are no non-conceptual humans, as long as they function
normally.
In other words, I don’t think we are dealing with
mathematics here as just one of out many academic
subjects, such as physics or biology or art or literature.
The first two subjects apply more to the “matter” corner
of our triangle, the latter two more to the “mind” corner
of our triangle, but “math” stands out as the surprising
fact of the regularity of the world, or if you like, the
surprising fact that we can view the world in such
unexpectedly regular ways and get away with it, without
contradictions, and with the ability to make accurate
predictions.
9C. Fundamentalist Critique of Mystic’s
Other-Source Diagram
My main objection to both the other source view and
the no-source view is an admittedly emotional one: I
perceive them as defeatist. Figures 5 and 6 both indicate
that the quest for a fundamental theory of everything is
ultimately doomed, and that the best we can do is go
off and meditate or optimize a ball bearing. Although
the Mystic hopes for great conceptual breakthroughs
ahead, I am not persuaded by his hypothesis that we
will come arbitrary close to a complete understanding
while remaining precluded from ever attaining it. I also
find the Mystic battle plan disturbingly vague, failing to
understand what specific steps we should take to explore
the object pole. In contrast, Figure 7 can be taken
as a specific battle cry to forge ahead in search of the
equations of a truly fundamental theory. This theory
may turn out to be too complex to be comprehensible to
us humans, but at least there’s hope. We shouldn’t give
up without trying!
D. Mystic’s Response:
I applaud the enthusiasm of the Fundamentalist, and
I share it. I only differ in the direction in which I think
we are likely to find the answers. The Fundamentalist
is in effect looking for the lost key under the lamp post.
He takes the objectivistic program, in which everything
is explained in third-person terms as interacting objects,
and hopes that that program will carry the day. But I see
that as a limiting case of a wider program, in which first-
person experience and a study of the subject qua subject
will augment our already very detailed studies of objects.
Within that wider program, I think we have much more
of a chance to find a horizon in which we can see how
all of our experiences hang together in a meaningful way,
without artificially reducing everything to a particular
subset of privileged phenomena.
What we really need to do is to go back to the state
of science as it was in the days of Galileo. He focused on
some very simple experiments, in which he rolled balls
from inclined planes and the like. I think we should
similarly focus on very simple experiments in which we
take the subject equally seriously as the object, and try
to see where that leads us. Such an approach may well
point the way to deeper forms of unification, including
the unification of subject and object [14].
V. DEBATING THE SECULARIST’S
NO-SOURCE DIAGRAM
A. Fundamentalist Critique of the Secularist’s
No-Source Diagram
The Secular view seems even more defeatist to me
than the Mystic one. In the Mystic’s view, there is at
least an underlying unity that we may one day be able
to understand better. The Secularist doesn’t even want
to bother searching for an underlying reality, since it
simply doesn’t exist. We are admonished to stop seeking
a deeper understanding since there is nothing deeper
to understand. I am convinced that there is a deep
explanation for it all, the only question being whether
we can understand it from the frog perspective of our
limited human minds.
B. Secular Response
The Fundamentalist needs to open his eyes to the world
that lies outside theoretical physics. Of course there is a
thrill in the thought that your research is opening up the
blueprints of the universe, but it is the guilty pleasure
of surrendering to vanity and parochialism. To submit
to it, you must convince yourself that we are living at
a special time, when the basic structure of math has
been determined (“formal systems”), and the final theory
of physics is at hand. These metaphysical yearnings
are easy to empathize with, but the whole approach is
shamelessly ahistorical. It has beneficial side-effects (the
ability to raise public enthusiasm, for example) but also
leads to a devaluation of the normal process of day-to-day
science.
The Fundamentalist says we should be searching for
an “underlying reality”. I agree that the laws of nature
are not immediately obvious, but reality itself is not
lying under anything. It is available for us to explore
by scientific or other means. Scientific methods have
been highly successful in giving us a coherent picture of
and control over the world we live in. In any reasonable
sense of the word “understand”, I believe there are many
aspects of the world that we either already understand
or can hope to understand in the future. However, the
Mystic and Fundamentalist both want to go further, to
an unimprovable understanding. They have some concept
of a hidden universal truth. But this can only be defined
as that which is yielded by the method they suggest
for finding it, and there is no reason to think that this
method will converge to a unique result.
C. Mystic’s Critique of the Secularist’s No-Source
Diagram
Even though the Secularist claims not to be a dualist,
and affirms unity between the aspects of mind and
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matter, his description of mind and matter as two
different “aspects” makes the two so separate as to make
it very hard for me to see where the unity lies. At least
a material reductionist has a clear form of unity to show
for, in that everything is considered to be reducible to
(properties of) matter. In the Secular view, the two
“aspects” that we “happen to distinguish sharply” form
an effectively dualistic picture of the world.
The whole notion of dualism as having any ultimate
standing, explicit or implied, goes against all that we
have learned in the history of physics. Time and again,
we started studying two seemingly separate topics, like
space and time, or electricity and magnetism, or matter
and energy, only to find out that they were merely poles
or aspects of a single more fundamental entity, such as
spacetime, electromagnetism, or matter-energy. In other
words, physics teaches us that dualistic descriptions are
nothing but harbingers of a deeper level of non-dual
understanding.
Even apart from my intuition as a physicist, all I ever
see in dualistic thinking is some form of either laziness
or fear. Yes, it is much simpler to keep the world neatly
partitioned, and then to study either side of the fence
at leisure. Crossing the fence requires more work and is
more risky, in that it may well undermine, at either side
of the fence, many prejudices held near and dear for a
long time.
Specifically, the strongest argument against dualism is:
if mind and matter really have nothing to do with each
other, how come they show up in the same world, and
how come they do seem to interact so tightly?
D. Secular Response
Perhaps the Mystic and Fundamentalist are reading
too much into my diagram: it is drawn in a pragmatic
rather than a metaphysical spirit. By their standards
I should refuse to draw any diagram at all. I see my
diagram as similar to the common-sense one that divides
living beings into plants and animals. These are obvious
categories that reflect important distinctions. That is all
it is trying to say.
VI. DEBATING THE FUNDAMENTALIST’S
RADICAL PLATONIC DIAGRAM
A. Secular Critique of the Fundamentalist’s
Radical Platonic Diagram
The Math→Matter link plays a crucial role in the
Fundamentalist’s diagram. It corresponds to a very
strong set of statements:
(F1) Physics is converging to some set of ultimate laws,
(F2) Our study of mathematics is converging towards an
“ultimate math”.
(F3) The ultimate laws will be expressed in terms of
the ultimate math. Thus math has a special
relationship to the material world.
(F4) It is plausible (or perhaps just aesthetically
appealing) that the ultimate math is not just an
external reality, but that our Universe consists of
it.
I find all these claims to be either meaningless or dubious.
Against (F1):
It is not clear that physics is converging to a set of
ultimate laws. Physics has changed greatly even in the
last 100 years. Our basic understanding of space and
time was revolutionized, and even the core concept of
the determinism of physical law was radically revised
by quantum mechanics, which introduced elements of
randomness that classical physicists would have found
unbelievable. There is no reason to think that
physics is now immune to such upheavals, or that it
ever will be. A related question is: when will we
declare that the convergence is complete? The cost of
testing our “fundamental” physical theories has escalated
dramatically over the last few decades as the relevant
energy scale rises. It seems likely that as these theories
are successively improved, it will become harder and
harder to do the experiments that would test them.
The theory that survives uncontradicted may do so
mainly because the difficulty of falsifying it becomes
insuperable. Another way to say this is that the time
between revolutions in physics will become longer, and
at some point one will not be able to tell whether it is
infinite. When this happens, the human need for novelty
will lead science down other, more rewarding, paths than
the search for a fundamental theory.
Against (F2):
Math is certainly progressing, but there is no reason to
think that it is converging to a definite structure, with
fixed questions and established ways to address them.
Consider the history of math. There was mathematics
before Hippasus the Pythagorean showed that
√
2 is
irrational; mathematics before Russell’s paradox, when
it was thought that arithmetic could be reduced to
set theory; the famous battle between intuitionists and
formalists, before Go¨del showed that there were true but
undecidable propositions; the computer proof of the 4-
color theorem by Appel and Haken. In each case we
find that progress did not just fill in some gaps, but
modified the idea of what mathematics is or should be.
Mathematics has taken radical turns in the past and will
do so in the future, stepping out in new directions that
confound attempts to systematize it once and for all. I
think this makes it impossible to formulate a coherent
concept of the “ultimate mathematics”.
Against (F3):
It is striking that mathematical methods have been
outstandingly successful in physics. But what is the
content of the assertion that any supposed ultimate
laws of physics must be “mathematical”? As I argued
above, mathematics has evolved over time. It has also
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been strongly influenced by physics. Five hundred years
from now physicists may be using methods that we
would find hard to recognize, and mathematics may have
grown to include those methods simply because they
work for physicists. Or perhaps the intellectual map
will have changed to the point where we can’t cleanly
identify a domain that we would call “physics”. Perhaps
the Fundamentalist would prefer to claim that ultimate
physical laws will have the character of what we now call
mathematics. That is simply a statement of faith, and
the Fundamentalist does not offer any reason to believe
it.
Against (F4):
(a) Plausibility. The Radical Platonist position is just
another metaphysical theory like solipsism, and even
materialism. In each case one starts with a decent theory
(mathematical descriptions of nature, sense-data as the
basis of cognition) and then raises it to an object of
worship, as having finally captured the essence of reality.
Philosophers from Kant to Wittgenstein have criticized
such thought for taking loose use of language to an
extreme where it fosters intellectual illusions [22]. In the
end the metaphysics just demands that we use a different
language for saying what we already knew. But what
is the difference? Nothing is gained by reformulating
“it is dark in here” as “I have few visual sensations” or
“the local intensity of electromagnetic radiation is low”.
Talk of conscious beings as “self-aware substructures” is
a similarly empty transcription.
(b) Aesthetic appeal. It is not clear that Math →
Matter is aesthetically attractive. Even if there were
some ultimate mathematics, it might be nothing like
what we now call math. It could easily seem as ugly
and contrived to us as irrational numbers and Russell’s
“repaired” set theory did to their contemporaries when
they were formulated.
Finally, the Fundamentalist describes himself as a
formalist and a Platonist, but these are contradictory. A
Platonist believes mathematical truths are truths about
some world of mathematical objects, while a formalist
believes that math is just the sum of all strings that
you can get by manipulating symbols according to rules,
starting with arbitrary axioms. As Go¨del’s theorem
shows, these are two different things: the methods
allowed by formalists cannot prove all the theorems in
a sufficiently powerful system. There are systems as
powerful as arithmetic that are consistent and complete,
and that therefore cannot be axiomatized (Ref. [13],
p. 126), and so are outside the formalist structure. This
spells doom to the Fundamentalist’s project. The idea
that math is “out there” is incompatible with the idea
that it consists of formal systems.
1. Fundamentalist reply
I would rephrase my assumptions as a Fundamentalist
as follows:
• Assumption A1: That the physical world
(specifically our Level III multiverse [21]) is a
mathematical structure.
• Assumption A2: Mathematical multiverse: that
all mathematical structures exist “out there” in the
same sense.
The Secularist (F1) critique of A1 is focused on the
question of whether our understanding of physics will
converging towards fundamental laws. I believe that if
we fail in this quest, if will be because of the limitations
of our human minds rather than because of the nature
of reality: I view it as almost tautological that there are
some fundamental laws that nature obeys: I assume that
there is an external reality that exists independently of
us humans, and the laws of physics are how this reality
works. Denying this external reality would be flirting
with solipsism, and I view it as human vanity taken to
the extreme.
Although the (F2 & F3) critique above suggests
that “ultimate math” is vague and undefined, there is
nothing vague about my two assumptions. The notion
of a mathematical structure is rigorously defined in any
book on Model Theory. The integers are well-defined
even though most of them have never been used in
human calculations, and mathematical structures are
likewise well-defined even though most of them have
yet to be explored by mathematicians. The Secularist
argued in Section II B 3 that alien mathematics might be
unrecognizable to us. If so, it would only be because
we are uncovering a different part of what is in fact a
consistent and unified picture, so math is converging in
this sense. The reason why this is far from apparent
is that our development of mathematics is in a very
early stage, nowhere near a systematic classification of
even the most basic structures/formal systems. Our
attention is therefore drawn to interesting features in the
mathematical landscape such as theorem X or formal
system Y , and we may not yet see the forest for all the
trees.
The secularist criticizes (F4) for loose use of language.
To me, all use of human language is necessarily loose
and hence insufficient for describing an external reality
existing independent of us. This is why nature speaks
the language of mathematics and why I am advocating
mathematical language to describe reality.
The objection that (F4) may be aesthetically unap-
pealing takes the anthropic principle to a comical ex-
treme, suggesting that the universe must be devised so
as to make us like it (note also that by Assumption 2, we
are part of merely one particular mathematical structure
in the vast Level IV multiverse of all structures, some
subjectively more elegant than others). I view the mys-
tic’s objection in Section II C to technological thinking as
a mode of alienation as either invoking similarly wishful
thinking (“our universe must be devised so as to not make
us feel alienated”) or as encouraging thought control.
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Aside from Wigner’s above-mentioned ubiquity of
mathematics in physics, a second argument supporting
assumption A1 (and F3) is that abstract mathematics is
so general that any fundamental “theory of everything”
that is definable in purely formal terms (independent
of vague human terminology) is also a mathematical
structure. For instance, a TOE involving a set of different
types of entities (denoted by words, say) and relations
between them (denoted by additional words) is nothing
but what mathematicians call a set-theoretical model,
and one can generally find a formal system that it is a
model of. In other words, if the physical world exists
independently of us humans, it is not obvious that it can
avoid being a mathematical structure.
Given A1, a second argument for assumption A2
(and F4) is that if two entities are isomorphic, then
there is no meaningful sense in which they are not one
and the same [23]. This implies assumption A2 when
the entities in question are a physical universe and a
mathematical structure describing it, respectively. To
avoid this conclusion that mathematical and physical
existence are equivalent, one would need to argue that
our universe is somehow made of stuff perfectly described
by a mathematical structure, but which also has other
properties that are not described by it. However,
this violates assumption A1 and implies either that
it is isomorphic to a more complicated mathematical
structure or that it is not mathematical at all. The latter
would be make Karl Popper turn in his grave, since those
additional bells and whistles that make the universe non-
mathematical by definition have no observable effects
whatsoever.
Finally, I find the objection involving Go¨del to be very
interesting and subtle. My hypothesis is that only Go¨del-
complete (fully decidable) mathematical structures have
physical existence. This drastically shrinks the Level
IV multiverse, essentially placing an upper limit on
complexity, and may have the attractive side effect of
explaining the relative simplicity of our universe. If you
define mathematical structures as (equivalence classes of)
models of axiom systems [3], then they are guaranteed
to be Go¨del-complete (consistent). Please note that
although we conventionally use a Go¨del-undecidable
mathematical structure (including integers with Peano’s
recursion axiom, etc.) to model the physical world,
it is not at all obvious that the actual mathematical
structure describing our world is a Go¨del-undecidable
one — lacking a theory of quantum gravity, we have
certainly not found it yet. Even a world corresponding
to a Go¨del-complete mathematical structure could in
principle contain observers capable of thinking about
Go¨del-incomplete mathematics, just as finite-state digital
computers can prove certain theorems about Go¨del-
incomplete formal systems like Peano arithmetic.
The classification project for consistent mathematical
structures may well prove far too difficult for us
humans to complete, but even partial success in this
endeavor could be useful, since the tiny fraction of
mathematics uncovered so far has gone such a long way
in understanding the physical world. So let’s not give up
without trying!
B. Mystic Critique of the Fundamentalist’s Radical
Platonic Diagram
On the convergence of math, I remain agnostic. I agree
that, historically, new developments were completely
unpredictable, and unexpected. And yes, there is a
“resistance” to mathematical objects that makes them
in many aspects like physical objects. As I mentioned
earlier, you can stumble on properties of triangles, like
you can stumble on furniture. In that sense, there
are certainly not a matter of fashion or convention
(although the framework, within which there are defined,
may be; I guess that is Secular’s main point). The
Fundamentalist’s belief that the current framework is
more than fashion is, I guess, a belief. I don’t see clear
arguments in favor of it, although I must say, intuitively,
it is rather appealing.
I share the Secularist’s doubts about the idea that the
world is “made of math”. My argument against this
is that it seems to me like a category mistake. The
category of existence of physical objects is different from
the category of existence of mathematical objects. For
one thing, this particular chair here exists, and is distinct
from a “chair in general’. Triangles always belong to
the latter category; I’ve never come across a particular
triangle with an individual existence like that of that of
a chair.
My intuition tells me that mathematics can never
be exhausted. Whenever we have tried to formalize
a system in the past, we wound up formalizing some
neatly delineated piece of turf, very interesting by itself,
but leaving out unexpected other developments that did
not fit the mould. Unless the Fundamentalist comes up
with a very good argument for the possibility of finding
an overarching “space of all models” together with a
clear structure governing that space, I don’t see how his
project could ever work. In mathematics, asking such
questions as “what is the set of all sets” has always run
into inconsistencies. I would expect something similar to
happen here.
In summary, I love the Fundamentalist project of
classifying mathematics to such an extent that the
parallels between “what is there” in math and “what
is there” in physics become compelling. I don’t expect
this project to be possible, in the end, but I do expect
interesting insight to come out of trying to make it work,
so therefore I’m all for it.
C. Fundamentalist Response
The resolution to the category issue is that the entire
Universe is a single mathematical structure, subsuming
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within it all particular physical objects.
I share the Mystic’s concern that the Radical Platonist
program may be extremely difficult for us humans to
carry though even if the underlying assumption is correct.
However, it’s worth a shot! My description of my vision
for the future (below) lists a few areas where it should
be possible to make at least limited progress.
VII. THREE VISIONS OF THE FUTURE
A. The Fundamentalist Vision
If the radical Platonist view is correct, both arrows in
Figure 7 deserve intense study since there is real hope
of understanding them better. This means continuing
with “business as usual” in both fundamental physics
research and brain/consciousness research. However, it
also suggests research in some slightly unconventional
directions as described below.
If all mathematical structures are equally real, then the
one we inhabit is but one in a vast ensemble, and should
be expected to be the most generic one compatible with
our existence. In the terminology of [21], this ensemble
or “Level IV multiverse” is vastly more diverse than the
Level I multiverse of spatial horizon volumes, the Level
II multiverse of different post-inflationary domains where
the same fundamental laws have produced different
effective laws from its landscape of possibilities, and the
Level III multiverse of unitary quantum mechanics. To
test this prediction, it is interesting to work out how the
Universe would differ if physical constants or equations
were altered, quantifying the degree to which it appears
fine-tuned for life.
The ultimate classification problem in mathematics
would be to classify all formal systems. Very little
progress has been made in this direction because of the
great difficulties involved, but any further insights about
the structure of mathematics could shed more light on
the nature of physics.
As described in Section IIA 2, a mathematical
structure can be viewed in two ways: from the bird
perspective of a mathematician or from the subjective
frog perspective of a self-aware substructure in it, like
us. Since the relation between these two perspectives
can be extremely subtle, a more systematic study of such
phenomenology issues will be important — otherwise our
candidate mathematical theories will not make testable
predictions, and we may not even recognize the correct
equations if we stumble across them.
Finally, since all mathematical structures are equally
real in this view, we need to keep a very open mind as
to what we are looking for. There is no room whatsoever
for subjective nostalgic bias towards structures that
resemble cozy classical concepts, or rejection of theories
because they are “too crazy”.
In conclusion, I feel that the fundamentalist vision is
the most specific and falsifiable of the three, subsuming
the Secularist’s to-do list and adding to it items that are
less vague than the Mystic’s. There are real calculations
to be done here, and my opinion is that controversial
philosophical arguments should never be used as excuses
not to make calculations.
B. The Secular Vision
Can a Secularist express a vision for the future? The
whole point of the secular view is to avoid grandiose
posturing. I have already given my expectations about
the future of fundamental physics (Section II B): as
it becomes harder to obtain experimental data against
which to test our most fundamental theories, it will
become harder to know whether we should believe them.
One cannot predict how fundamental physics will then
progress. It might continually find unexpected directions
in which to proceed, such as the one hoped for by the
Mystic. It might change so drastically that we would no
longer recognize it as physics, or even science. Finally, it
might simply atrophy away.
If I grapple with any deep mysteries, they are not about
the meaning of science, but about the way people see the
world. Science is the process of building a picture of the
world that is, where possible, quantitatively accurate.
It strikes some balance between conservatism (making
minimal changes to established pictures) and radicalism
(abandoning pictures that do not work). But many
people feel that science is incomplete without a deeper
claim than mere predictive power. They want to tilt
the balance towards conservatism, treating the picture,
current or future, as metaphysical truth. The mystic
and fundamentalist thinkers show this tendency, and, in
a wider context, some of the most successful religions
display an extreme form of such conservatism, requiring
adherence to a rigid set of beliefs that vary very slowly.
It is striking, and mysterious to me, that so many people
feel a strong need for such a frozen picture.
What impresses me is the degree to which our
current understanding of the universe would be utterly
incomprehensible to previous generations. It seems very
reasonable to expect that human ideas will continue to
develop in unpredictable ways, and that the theories of
the future will explore directions that we cannot even
imagine today. Ironically, it may be the fundamentalist
and mystically inclined thinkers who bring this about. I
am inclined to believe that those who think that their
theories uncover the deep structure of the world are the
ones who are driven most strongly to make essential and
revolutionary contributions to the progress of theoretical
physics.
C. The Mystic Vision
We have painted ourselves in a corner, scientifically,
by describing the whole world in objective terms, and
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finding less and less room for ourselves to stand on. The
challenge we now face is not to reduce ourselves also
to objects, but to explore ways to let science naturally
widen its area of investigation, while staying true to
its methodology of peer review, based on an interplay
between theory and experiment, with experiment having
the last word.
For the last four hundred years, natural science has
studied the object pole of experience in ever increasing
detail. While this has so far been a sensible approach, we
are now reaching the limits of a purely object-oriented
treatment. In various areas of science, from quantum
mechanics to neuroscience and robotics, the subject
pole of experience can no longer be neglected. Most
likely, science will change qualitatively with this required
extension of its methodology.
This will not happen overnight. I expect this program
to be carried out over a period of time comparable to
the time it took to get the science of the object up and
running, perhaps a century, quite likely a few centuries.
But this process cannot and should not be hurried
by wishful thinking or by external agendas. Imagine
what would have happened if physicists had listened to
William Blake, two centuries ago, who fulminated against
their clockwork picture of the Universe. If they had
tried to start a new “poetic physics” by trying to force
Blake’s notions into the accepted framework of physics,
they would have been led astray. Nothing has come,
fortunately, from “communist biology” in the days of
Lysenko or the “Aryan physics” of the Nazis.
Real progress in physics can only come from
within, from a necessity to introduce wider frameworks
of explanation and interpretation to accommodate
experimental facts that cannot be satisfactorily dealt
with in the existing frameworks. After Blake’s
complaints, more than a hundred years passed before
physicists discovered quantum mechanics, which showed
that the material world is indeed really a far cry
from a clockwork universe. The original dogmas of
repeatability and strict causality, in the classical sense
in which nothing happens spontaneously, were shown to
be incorrect. These ideas had been extremely helpful to
get physics off the ground. But in the end they were
forms of dogma that had to be discarded.
The beautiful thing about physics is that it has an
orderly way to conduct revolutions, and to discard older
ideas; or more accurately, to assign older ideas to their
proper domain of limited significance, while moving on
to more accurate descriptions of reality. I expect that
a thorough exploration of the presence and ways of
functioning of the subject, on a par with that of objects,
will revolutionize science in a constructive way, within
this century and the next.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the nature of reality in the
ontological context of Penrose’s math-matter-mind
triangle. Physicists have widely differing views of the
deeper meaning of physics, and we have found that
we three authors reflect this disparity. Despite our
similarities in research interests, knowledge and cultural
background, we espouse conflicting views that we have
termed fundamentalist, secular, and mystic. A key
message for non-physicists reading this paper is therefore
that they should be deeply suspicious of any self-
proclaimed popularizer or other ambassador claiming to
speak on these matters on behalf of the consensus of the
theoretical physics community.
A second noteworthy conclusion is that despite these
disagreements, we advocate rather similar paths forward.
This illustrates that physicists can vary strongly in their
interpretations of the meaning of physics, while agreeing
quite well on how it should be done.
Looking to the immediate future of physics, one thing
that we agree on is that the diversity in views in
the physics community is healthier than an ontological
monoculture. Our best hope of making progress on the
open questions of physics is to tackle them with a wide
variety of ideas.
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